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PUBLIC OPINION BACKLASHES AND THE




URING the 1990s, Latin America was a leader in privatization
transactions. Between 1990 and 2001, it accounted for 47 per-
cent (or $361 billion) of all investments in infrastructure projects
in developing countries.1
Likewise, in terms of proceeds, Latin America far outpaced other de-
veloping areas, netting an estimated $178 billion between 1990 and 1999.2
In the 1990s, Latin America also pioneered a wide variety of state divesti-
ture strategies, which made it a point of reference for other developing
countries in other parts of the world attempting privatization policies.
There is also enough empirical evidence suggesting that privatization not
only had a positive impact on profitability, output, productivity, 3 employ-
ment,4 government taxes/fiscal balance,5 and prices,6 but also on the so-
cial welfare of the poor by providing access to basic services. 7
These positive results notwithstanding, by the mid-2000s the privatiza-
tion of utilities was out of favor. Protests against the private provision of
public services took place in several Latin American countries leading to
* Dept. of Political Science, Southern Methodist University
1. Clive Harris, PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: TRENDS, IMPACTS, AND POLICY LESSONS, World Bank Working Paper
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2. Alberto Chong & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Privatization in Latin America:
What Does the Evidence Say?, 4 ECONOMIA, 37, 43 (Spring 2004).
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the cancellation or renegotiation of existing contracts. Ironically, some of
these privatizations had had been regarded as best practice cases only a
few years earlier.8 These events confirmed previous findings from the
Latinobarometro opinion polls which, since 1998, showed that the major-
ity of respondents across Latin America disapproved of privatization.
The negative trend reached its peak in 2003 when only 22 percent had a
positive opinion about state divestiture (Figure 1). The trend reversed
itself thereafter but, by 2007, the Latin American average still showed
that only 35 percent of respondents believed that privatization had been
beneficial to their country. After 2000, public opinion's negative assess-
ment of privatization also mirrored a sharp decline in private investments
and widespread pessimism about the future of new infrastructure projects
in the region.
Coincidentally, by the early 2000s, Latin America witnessed the coming
to power of a new brand of populist presidents who capitalized on popu-
lar dissatisfaction with market reforms in general, and privatization in
particular. Using a left-wing rhetoric Hugo Chavez (Venezuela), Nestor
Kirchner (Argentina), and Evo Morales (Bolivia) proceeded in re-nation-
alizing key industries that had been previously privatized or renegoti-
ating/cancelling existing concession contracts. These three leaders seem
to symbolize a return to heavy government regulation and economic na-
tionalism that dominated Latin America from the 1950s until the late
1980s. 9 Their initiatives created widespread speculations that, given the
unpopularity of market-oriented policies, more Latin American leaders
would follow a similar path. Indeed, the situation is worrisome enough
that in his review of private infrastructures, a well-known expert warned
that the "politics of reform is challenging, and some countries may see a
longer-term reversal to public provision." 10
This paper constitutes a preliminary attempt to assess why in Latin
America, public opinion turned against privatization and what the
chances are of a re-nationalization of utility infrastructures. In the first
part of the paper, I will examine the factors that seem to have played a
pivotal role in turning the wave against privatization, by paying particular
attention to the "politics" of reform. In the second part, I will then assess
the strength of three general theses that pundits and academics have re-
cently put forward to explain why the public has turned against privatiza-
tion in Latin America: 1) Latin Americans have embraced left wing
ideologies, which reject market reforms in general, and privatization in
particular; 2) the economic crisis of the early 2000s has negatively af-
fected people's evaluation of privatization; and 3) the degree to which
privatization has produced good results and has been affected by corrup-
tion drives people's evaluations.
8. Monte Reel, Turning the Taps Back to the States: Privatization of Utilities Falls Out
of Favor in Latin America, WASH. POST, March 27, 2006 at A10.
9. Paul Haslam, Is There a New Left Post-Consensus Policy towards Foreign Direct
Investors in Latin America? (Mimeo, University at Ottawa 2007).
10. Harris, supra note 1 at 2.
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Lastly, in the third and concluding section, I will assess whether the
recent trends in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina are likely to expand to
the rest of Latin America or are dictated by business cycles peculiar to
such countries. Put it differently; are we on the verge of a reversal of
privatization and market reforms in the region as some people fear?
II. WHAT WENT WRONG IN LATIN AMERICA?
There is not a single factor that can, by itself, explain why private utili-
ties in Latin America have come under fire in recent years. However,
there is substantial agreement among academics and analysts that what
makes private utilities more susceptible to political backlashes stems from
two facts. First, they are considered essential goods by the public as they
are widely consumed. Second, from 1950s until the 1980s, Latin Ameri-
can governments, regardless of their nature (i.e., democratic, authorita-
rian, populist) managed infrastructure utility services (water, electricity,
telephones, transportation) according to "political criteria." One of such
criteria was keeping rates below cost to retain popular support. Thus, for
four decades Latin Americans became accustomed to services which,
while poor in quality, were cheap and highly subsidized. The academic
literature has identified several factors that alone, or in combination,
seem to have had a negative impact on the sustainability of privately
owned utility infrastructures in the past ten years.
A. DISPERSE BENEFITS VS. CONCENTRATED LOSSES
As Nellis argues, privatization's benefits are usually dispersed across
sectors of society that are unorganized, and consequently fail to mobilize
in its support.11 The poor, for instance, who thanks to privatization have
been able for the first time get access to water and electricity, often do
not associate lower tariffs with privatization and are easy prey of anti-
privatization groups assuring that under state ownership tariffs would
drop and service quality improve. By contrast, costs are highly concen-
trated among groups (laid off employees, government bureaucrats, and
middle and upper-middle consumers who cannot enjoy highly subsidized
services) can easily organize an effective opposition strategy. In the case
of the water privatization in the Colombian cities of Baranquilla and Car-
tagena for instance, opposition came from local politicians and their cli-
enteles within the company employees, as well as the upper-middle class
city dwellers who saw their illegal connections and cheap rates come to
an end. The poor, who benefited from service expansion and good qual-
ity water at cheap rates, took a while to organize and support the private
water company in its effort to resist re-nationalization attempts.
B. INFLATED EXPECTATIONS LED TO BIG DISAPPOINTMENTS
In the early 1990s, both investors and government developed rosy ex-
11. John Nellis, Privatization: A Summary Assessment, 27 SAIS REV., 3 (2007).
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pectations about the benefits that utility privatization would bring. 12 In
some potentially lucrative privatizations, like telecommunications and
electricity, overbidding was common, creating artificial bubbles. Such ex-
pectations were often based upon empirical models that linked sustained
growth to market reform success. However, as it can be seen from Figure
2, the regression models' growth predictions turned out to be way out of
step with reality. For instance, some regression models predicted that,
"Bolivia's growth to be 1.9 percent per year faster in the 1990s than in the
1970s," but in reality growth was 0.23 percent slower.13 Thus, Bolivians
could rightly wonder whether it was worth going through the pain of pol-
icy reforms to grown only by 1.53 percent a year during the 1990s as op-
posed to 1.67 percent during the economic unstable decade of the
1970s. 14
Moreover, although indexes of reform policies showed better perform-
ance for Latin America as a whole in 1999 than Chile in 1985, which pio-
neered such reforms two decades earlier, this did not translate into major
improvements in GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita.15 The
counter argument by pro-reform economists is that had Latin America
not embarked upon market reforms, including privatization, the situation
would have been much worse. The problem is that most Latin Americans
do not have the information and level of expertise of such economists.
Like most people around the world, they base their judgment on simple
heuristics and the degree to which government promises are fulfilled.
When they embarked upon reforms in the 1990s, Latin American presi-
dents went on the record stating that while painful sacrifices were inevita-
ble in the short term, market reforms would eventually bare the expected
fruits: economic stability, growth, jobs, and modern and more efficient
utility infrastructures under private management. By 2000, it was clear
that many of these promises did not materialize. Politicians saw priva-
tization as the panacea that would solve all problems, but they vastly
overestimated their ability to manage the politics of reform. Conversely,
private investors overestimated the governments' ability to honor their
commitments in the face of unexpected domestic difficulties. By 1995,
the initial euphoria was gone and in the absence of dramatic improve-
ments, opposition to tariff increases, foreign ownership, and layoffs made
the sustainability of the reform effort all the more difficult. Indeed, tar-
iffs were usually the thorniest issue. While governments may have recog-
nized that tariffs were so depressed that sizable adjustments were
inevitable, they failed to appreciate popular opposition, particularly when
service improvements were slow coming, which in the eyes of the public
made tariff hikes illegitimate.
12. Harris, supra note 1; Nellis supra note 11.
13. World Bank, WASHINGTON, DC, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990s: LEARNING
FROM A DECADE OF REFORM, 39 (2005) [hereinafter Economic Growth].
14. Id.
15. Id. at 36.
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C. GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR OPPORTUNISM
The previous discussion leads us inevitably to the opportunism from
both government and private companies alike, which on many occasions
tarnished the reputation of state divestiture. On the one hand, there
were numerous instances when governments agreed on lucrative tariff
structures and the creation of "independent" regulatory agencies to lure
potential investors, knowing all too well that they could not keep their
end of the bargain. In fact, once private companies made their invest-
ments, and popular dissatisfaction with tariffs grew stronger, the same
governments (and more so those which succeeded them) seized the op-
portunity to make the new private enterprises the scapegoat of the situa-
tion. According to Guasch, in their survey of contract renegotiations in
Latin America, this phenomenon was particularly acute during or after an
election year.16 This about face decision was even easier to accomplish
using nationalistic rhetoric when such companies were foreign-owned.
Using a variety of pretexts, opportunistic governments thus proceeded in
lowering tariffs, restricting companies' price flexibility options, demand-
ing new investments not contemplated in the original contracts, and im-
posing new regulations on company operations and employment policy.
17
On the other hand, some private companies expected governments to
eventually renege their commitments. This led to the stipulation of priva-
tization deals contemplating costly government bailouts, which angered
the general public. Such guarantees meant that companies had little in-
terest in crafting well designed projects. Instead, they put a premium in
recovering as much as possible their initial investments through high
tariff structures, which doomed the political sustainability of some
projects from the start. 18 Typical examples of this pattern are the toll-
road and electricity privatizations in Mexico and the Dominican Repub-
lic, respectively. 19
D. BUSINESS CYCLE EFFECT
As noted earlier, the initial econometric models justifying the adoption
of market reforms assumed that once the right policies were in place,
long-term economic growth would ensue. Unfortunately, these models
did not contemplate the possibility of external shocks, which affected
many Latin American countries. The financial crises in Mexico (1995),
East Asia (1997), Brazil (1998-99), and Argentina (2002) had serious
16. Jean Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont, & Stephane Straub, Concessions of Infra-
structure in Latin America: Government-led Renegotiation, 22 J. APPLIED ECON.
1267 (2005).
17. SPILLED WATER: INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT IN THE PROVISION OF WATER SER-
VICES (William Savedoff & Pablo Spiller eds., Inter-American Development Bank
1999).
18. Harris, supra note 1; Nellis supra note 11.
19. The magnitude of some bailouts was staggering. Mexico had to pay $7 billion to
rescue its failed toll road privatization scheme. Harris, supra note 1; Nellis, supra
note 11.
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repercussions through their contagion effects, which reverberated across
emerging markets. These crises fueled criticisms against market reforms,
and privatization in particular, as they left Latin American countries
more exposed than ever to factors beyond their control. The sus-
tainability of privatization rested upon a stable macroeconomic environ-
ment, which would keep inflation in check, thus averting tariff increases
through indexation mechanisms included in many divestiture contracts.
The decision of some countries to adopt steep currency devaluations,
amidst an evolving recession, undermined the very premises of existing
tariff structures. The combination of inflation and income contraction,
resulting from the economic crisis led to lengthy and highly disputed tariff
renegotiations, which exacerbated relations between governments (facing
political pressure from the public retain existing rates) and privatized
companies (which risked losing large amounts of money in the absence of
a new accord). Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, which suffered the most
severe crises, opted for different strategies. Mexico and Brazil were more
conciliatory and found a way to avoid complete fallout with the private
infrastructure companies. Argentina instead, from 2002 onward, took a
defiant stand by freezing most tariffs until 2007 and deliberately forcing
many foreign companies out and replacing them with domestic investors
willing to cooperate with President Kirchner's demands. This resulted in
a score of foreign utility infrastructure companies filing lawsuits against
Argentina before the International Centre of Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). 20
E. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND CORRUPTION
On many occasions, privatization deals occurred under a cloud of sus-
picion of impropriety, which undermined the legitimacy of policy from
the start and contributed to the demise of several projects when public
opinion turned against state divestiture. Often, governments steamrolled
key utility infrastructure privatizations in an attempt to prevent the or-
ganization of an effective anti-privatization movement. Pressure from the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to act quickly gave
governments additional arguments to move in unilateral fashion without
building enough political consensus.21 However, the decision to hastily
organize privatization transactions ruled out the need to make the pro-
cess transparent. Indeed, it was the lack of transparency characterizing
many transactions that opened up large windows of opportunities for col-
lusion between government officials and private bidders. Since most
state divestiture programs took place in a context where checks and bal-
ances were either weak or were emasculated on purpose, the necessary
20. Since 1966, the ICSID has worked as an arbitration tribunal to settle disputes over
investment disputes. The ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty formulated by
the Executive Directors of the World Bank. Between 2002 and 2008 Argentina
had the largest amount of lawsuits pending before the ICSID of any merging mar-
ket in the world.
21. Economic Growth, supra note 13.
PUBLIC OPINION BACKLASHES
accountability and transparency conditions were sorely lacking. Potential
collusion and corruption were particularly acute when privatizations took
the form of direct sales and their context shielded them from public scru-
tiny. In some cases, privatizations were explicitly designed to favor do-
mestic entrepreneurs close to the administration in office (i.e., Mexico
under the Salinas de Gortari administration, 1998-94; and Argentina
under the Carlos Menem administration, 1989-1999). This was justified
to retain domestic control of key industries, but in practice responded to
a well-understood political quid pro quo between government and busi-
ness. Consequently, allegations of bribe taking at the expense of the na-
tional coffers and consumers abounded in the most important markets,
including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. It must be stressed
that entrepreneurs were not always on the receiving end of corrupt deals.
As Nellis underscored, "Efforts of investors to influence bid outcomes,
obtain costly and sometimes illegal concessions and terms (pre- and post-
bid), or collude to reduce the price offered, are often alleged. '22
In a recent article, Martimort and Straub, the lack of transparency and
the "grand-level corruption" associated with utility infrastructure priva-
tization were the crucial factors in affecting the mounting dissatisfaction
toward state divestiture.23 In their view, popular dissatisfaction increases
with perceived higher levels of corruption. This view is particularly com-
mon within the middle class, who feels victimized by corrupt privatiza-
tions as it bears the bulk of the costs of increased tariffs, which are the
end result of collusive deals. I will now turn to the analysis of the main
theses that have tried to explain why public opinion, since 1998, has
turned against about privatization. In some cases, there will be an over-
lapping of such theses with the factors just described.
III. WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS UNHAPPY
ABOUT PRIVATIZATION?
A. THESIS ONE: LATIN AMERICANS HAVE MOVED TO THE LEFT
The coming to power of fiery presidents like Hugo Chavez (Vene-
zuela), Elvo Morales (Bolivia), Nestor Kirchner (Argentina), and Rafael
Correa (Ecuador), and more recently Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (not to
mention the close defeat of Andr6s L6pez Obrador in Mexico during the
2006 presidential elections), all of whom espouse a brand of populism
with strong-left wing-overtones, has led some pundits to speculate that
the failure of market reforms has created a breeding ground for the emer-
gence of a new left in Latin America, which these presidents well re-
present.24 However, once we pay a closer look at the phenomenon, we
notice that presidents who have ideologically committed to socialism like
Brazil's Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva (commonly dubbed as Lula), Chile's
22. Nellis, supra note 11 at 17.
23. David Martimort & Stephane Straub, Privatization and Corruption (Mimeo, Uni-
versity of Toulouse 2006).
24. Greg Gradin, Latin America's New Consensus, THE NATION, Apr. 13, 2006.
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Michele Bachelet, and Uruguay's Tabar6 Vizquez, have been much more
moderate in their economic policy-making. In point of fact, both Lula
and Bachelet have continued the free market policies inherited from their
predecessors, while trying new social programs to reduce income
inequalities.
These trends present a puzzle. If the "popular shift to the left thesis"
were correct, we should see socialists, more so than populist presidents,
attacking market reforms and reneging/renegotiating privatization deals.
The Latinobarometro surveys help us shed some light into it. Table 1
shows the percentage of people identifying themselves as being extrem-
ists (either left or right). Although variations exist across countries, the
number of extremists remains fairly stable, and relatively small through-
out the 1996-2003 period. What is also interesting is that in Venezuela,
Bolivia, and Argentina, the number of left-wing extremists has grown
very little and remains confined to a very small segment of the popula-
tion. Further evidence that such a thesis is unsubstantiated is displayed in
Figure 3, where respondents identified themselves according to a left-to-
right political scale. The findings reported in this figure show that the
bulk of Latin Americans consider themselves as centrists and, overall,
conservatives are almost twice as many as left-wingers.
Thus, the anti-market moves that have characterized Chavez, Morales,
and Kirchner may respond to their intention to capitalize on popular dis-
satisfaction about the way market reforms have performed rather than to
their eagerness of leading the growing numbers of left-wing voters in
their respective countries. An indication that political opportunism may
be at the heart of these presidents' recent policies comes from Kirchner's
track record. When in the early 1990s he was governor of the oil and gas
rich province of Santa Cruz, Kirchner played a major role in convincing
fellow governors to approve President Carlos Menem's privatization of
the Argentine oil company Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales, in exchange
for large royalties. Prior to being elected president in 2003, Kirchner
never gave any sign of being opposed to market reforms, including priva-
tization. As for Morales, his socialist rhetoric seems to be grounded in
the communitarian culture of the native people of Bolivia, which voted
overwhelmingly for him, rather than in a true ideology. In fact, if we go
back to Table 1, no more than 10 percent of Bolivians, on average, have
identified themselves as left-wing leaning. In brief, the fact that populist,
rather than socialist presidents, have nationalized utility infrastructures or
forced major contract renegotiations to their advantage, seems to re-
spond to political opportunism, not a major shift to socialist policies.
B. THESIS Two: ECONOMIC CRISIS
A second popular thesis interprets the negative change in public opin-
ion to the business cycle, as it was described earlier in this paper. Put
differently, people ascribe to market reforms the fact that their countries
experienced poor economic growth (and in some cases, major financial
PUBLIC OPINION BACKLASHES
crises) between the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. Panizza and
Yafiez argue that it is indeed the collapse in economic activity at the turn
of the 21st century in most of Latin America which explains the popular
backlash against reforms.25 In articulating their thesis, Panizza and
Yafiez first show how major economic variables deteriorated appreciably
after 1997 (Table 2).26 Save for inflation, the output gap, unemployment,
and the depth of the crisis all point to a sharp deterioration by 2002.27
Table 3 reports the results of Panizza and Yafiez's regression analysis,
which tries to determine the impact of economic variables on public opin-
ion based upon Latinobarometro surveys. The dependent variables are
attitudes toward privatization and the market economy. The economic
variables are lagged by one year, and the control variables include age,
sex, and wealth (in quintiles). The results generally confirm the business
cycle thesis, even though unemployment is not statistically significant
when all the economic variables are entered simultaneously in the equa-
tion. In commenting their results, Panizza and Yafiez (2006:11) remark:
Let us look, for instance, at the relationship between the output gap
and the support for privatization (which during the 1998-2003 period,
went from 52 to 25 percent). Average output gap was 3 percent in
1997, and -3 percent in 2002 (a change of 6 percentage points). By
multiplying 6 by the estimated coefficient (0.011), we obtain 0.066
(6.6 percent), which is close to one-third of the total drop in support
for reforms.
The case of Argentina is a striking example of the importance of
macroeconomic factors. In Argentina, the output gap went from 7
percent in 1997 to -14 percent in 2002. By itself, this explains a drop
in support for privatization equivalent to 23 percentage points, which
is about 80 percent of the observed drop in support for privatization
in Argentina (which fell from 45 to 13 percent). 28
These are fairly robust results and, intuitively, make a lot of sense.
However, Panizza and Yafiez's model does not incorporate important
control variables, beyond sex, age, and income distribution. Thus, their
findings must be interpreted with caution.
C. THESIS THREE: CORRUPTION AND LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
It is precisely the incompleteness of Panizza and Yafiez's model, which
brings us to the next thesis: the importance of corruption and lack of
transparency in determining negative attitudes about privatization. As
noted earlier, according to Martimort and Straub, the most important
reason determining the unpopularity of privatization stems from the pub-
25. Ugo Panizza & Monica Yanez, Why Are Latin Americans Unhappy about Reforms,
8 J. APPLIED ECON. 1 (2005).
26. Id.
27. The output gap results from the log deviation between actual GDP from trend
GDP. The depth of the crisis was estimated by "multiplying the GDP gap by mi-
nus one and setting economic expansion equal to zero" Id at 19.
28. Id. at 23.
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lic perception that state divestiture fueled corrupt deals between compa-
nies and government officials at the expense of consumers in the form of
high utility rates due to cost-through charged to customers. 29 In fact, sus-
picion of corruption was not just limited to the initial transfer or conces-
sion rights from the state to the private sector, but extended to the
numerous, and highly controversial, renegotiations of the initial contracts
within which rate hikes figured prominently. Guasch and Straub esti-
mated that between 1985 and 2000 contract renegotiations in Latin
America involved 74 percent of water concession and 55 percent of trans-
port concessions. 30 More to it, such renegotiations took place shortly af-
ter private companies won the award. Although most contracts had a
fifteen-year life span, in the water sector renegotiations occurred, on av-
erage, after 1.6 years, whereas in transport it took 3.1 years.
Bonnet et al. recently developed a more encompassing model than
Panizza and Yafiez's to assess the determinants of public opinion vis-A-vis
privatization.31 Besides the economic and social independent variables,
their model includes corruption, institutional variables and several demo-
graphic, employment, asset, and access to service variables. Bonnet et al.
create a "pseudo panel" model in order to take into account unobserved
individual effects. 32 The results reported in Table 4 show that once eco-
nomic variables are controlled for, they cease to be statistically signifi-
cant. Much of the same can be said about the relevance of assessments
concerning the present and future economic situation. Conversely, Bon-
net et al. results confirm previous findings by Checchi et al., who con-
cluded that those who were likely to have suffered from privatization,
such as public sector employees and the unemployed, were the most criti-
cal about privatization.33 Similarly, those who identified themselves as
right wing, and may have had high expectations, were more likely to be
disappointed, and therefore dissatisfied. 34 Moreover, Bonnet el al. find
that corruption does matter as it can be seen in columns three to five.35
Likewise, complementary opinion variables such as trust and democracy
preference are mostly significant and with the expected negative sign.
This further suggests the importance of corruption as a powerful explana-
tory variable. In fact, Bonnet et al. contend that "the preference for de-
mocracy is likely to capture a related aspect to the extent that individuals
expressing a stronger preference in that sense may also be expecting a
29. Martimort, supra note 23.
30. Jean Louis Guasch & Stephane Straub, Renegotiation of Infrastructure Conces-
sions: An Overview, 77 ANNALS OF PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 479, 483 (2006).
31. Celine Bonnet, Pierre Dubuois, David Martimort, & Stephane Straub, Empirical
Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and
Beliefs (Mimeo 2006).
32. Id.
33. Daniele Checchi, Massimo Floria, & Jorge Carrera, Privitazation Discontent and
its Determinants Evidence from Latin America (Dipartmento di Economia Politica
e Aziendale, Universita di Milano 2005).
34. This result is consistent with Panizza and Yafiez (2005).
35. Bonnet, supra note 31.
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more participatory and transparent policy making process. '36 In other
words, people who believe in the democratic process form pessimistic
evaluations of privatization due to its lack of transparency and the
probability that such policy was manipulated for corrupt ends.
Although these are preliminary findings, the impact of corruption and
accountability cannot be underestimated and its interaction with eco-
nomic variables should be investigated further. In general, experts point
out that when governments carried out divestiture in infrastructure utility
through a transparent process, public opinion backlashes were less likely
to occur. For instance, Harris cites a 2002 public opinion poll in Peru
after the government had postponed the sale of two public utilities to
avert riots.37 In the survey, 59 percent of the respondents found priva-
tization acceptable if it was done in a transparent fashion. Another 65
percent agreed on price increases if they were approved by a regulatory
agency, and 69 percent favored privatization provided that the new pri-
vate company would expand services.
IV. ARE WE ON THE BRINK OF A NEW ERA
OF NATIONALIZATIONS?
In the past few years, the nationalizations or contract renegotiations
that Chavez, Morales, and Kirchner imposed on private infrastructure
utility operators have dominated the headlines out of Latin America.
Does this mean that this trend will affect other countries in the region any
time soon? The evidence suggests that it is unlikely that this will be the
case. Between 1990 and 2001 less than 2 percent of the 2,500 private
infrastructure projects suffered nationalizations or cancellations. 38 This
number has increased only slightly since then. As I noted earlier, nation-
alizations or contract renegotiations have occurred mostly under populist
presidents. More ideologically oriented leaders in Brazil, Chile, Peru,
and Uruguay have instead realized that growth can only come if market
conditions are favorable to foreign and domestic private investments. 39
In other words, for these politicians, the engine of economic growth re-
mains the private sector. Thus, they have limited themselves to the redis-
tribution of wealth toward the lower social classes, but have not tampered
with private property. Kirchner himself seemed to have adopted a mixed
political strategy. In the cases of some water companies and the national
postal service, he proceeded in re-nationalizing utility companies man-
aged by foreign and domestic investors respectively. However, in most
other cases, he has aimed at replacing foreign investors in key infrastruc-
ture utilities with domestic ones that he can manipulate more easily.
36. Id.
37. Harris, supra note 1 at 13.
38. Id. at 10.
39. For a Marxist critique of both populist and socialist presidents in Latin America
see James Petras, The Empire Changes Gears, COUNTERPUNCH , Dec. 7, 2004,
available at http://info.interactivist.netnode/3909.
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However, it is unmistakable that less and less people in Latin America
believe that the market economy alone is the best way to develop their
countries. According to the Latinobarometro, in 2007 people expressing
confidence in the market were only 41 percent as opposed to 57 percent
in 2000.40 This is a significant drop, but again it must be interpreted with
caution. The very fact that the bulk of Latin Americans identify them-
selves to be on the center-right of the political spectrum would suggest
that the loss of confidence in market reforms is not due to an ideologi-
cally change of heart but, rather, to the disillusionment with their results.
In brief, people may not want less market but a better, more competitive
and efficient one that creates opportunities rather than corruption, collu-
sions, and rents under private ownership. Analysts agree that when the
divestiture process is transparent, and brings competition (when possi-
ble), effective regulation, service expansion (particularly for the poor),
and fair tariff rates, consensus and trust in support for privatization solid-
ify. The challenge for pro-market politicians remains to find the appro-
priate strategy to build consensus around privatization while making sure
that such a policy bears the expected fruits.
40. THE ECONOMIST 15 November 2007
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FIGURE 1. PRIVATIZATION HAS BEEN BENEFICIAL
(1998-2007)
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FIGURE 2. PREDICTED AND ACTUAL GROWTH BY





Source: World Bank (2005:34)
FIGURE 3. RESPONDENTS' IDEOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION
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TABLE 2. MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES (1994-2002)
GDP Gap Unemployment Inflation Depth of Crisis
Year Average SD Average SD Average SD Average SD
1994 2.04 1.99 7.49 2.68 0.27 0.27 0.07 0.17
1995 1.21 2.99 8.62 3.98 0.17 0.11 0.7 1.62
1996 1.37 2.42 9.64 4.1 0.15 0.11 0.46 1.08
1997 3.16 2.76 8.79 3.6 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.43
1999 0.37 3.27 10.38 4.45 0.08 0.09 1.26 1.84
2000 0.44 2.59 10.02 4.64 0.09 0.11 0.83 1.44
2002 -3.35 5.04 10.76 4.25 0.07 0.06 3.9 4.27
Panizza and Yafiez (2006:19)
TABLE 3. MACROECONOMIC FACTORS AND SUPPORTS
FOR REFORM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Priv. Priv. Priv. Priv. Priv. Market Market Market Market Market
GDP Gap 0.012 0.014 0.032 0.04
(5.36)*** (2.72)*** (5.22)*** (3.08)***
UnempL. -0.023 0 -0.05 0.022
(3.01)*** -0.01 (2.16)** -0.62
Inflation 0.416 0.585 1.826 2.146





AGE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 0
(2.87)*** (2.33)** (3.00)*** (2.91)*** (2.35)** -1.58 -1.22 (1.94)* -1.62 1.17
SEX -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 -0.022 -0.021 -0.018 .018
(2.78)*** (2.89)*** (2.78)*** (2.78)*** (2.86)*** (3.28)*** (3.96)*** (3.71)*** (3.53)*** (3.07)***
quintile==2 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.006
-1.06 -0.3 -0.99 -1.03 -0.24 -0.12 -0.53 -0.44 -0.21 .65
quintile==3 0.003 0.01 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.015 0.021
-0.27 -1.12 -0.16 -0.25 -1.29 -1.61 (1.85)* -1.47 -1.58 (2.14)**
quintile==4 0.02 0.029 0.02 0.02 0.029 0.023 0.032 0.03 0.024 0.03
(1.80)* (2.94)*** (1.79)* (1.82)* (2.97)*** (2.26)** (3.38)*** (2.86)*** (2.25)** 1(3.47)***
quintile==5 0.079 0.089 0.078 0.079 0.09 0.039 0.052 0.043 0.039 0.05
(4.84)*** (5.56)*** (4.78)*** (4.84)*** (5.66) * * * (2.69)*** (3.56)*** (3.00)*** (2.67)*** (3.83)***
Constant 0.398 0.622 0.364 0.425 0.334 0.558 1.041 0.391 0.646 0.122
(23.09)*** (8.25)*** (10.14)*** (21.66)*** (2.37)** (34.75) * * (4.68)*** (3.02)*** (33.13)*** -0.34
Observations 65083 58013 65083 65083 58013 48009 42615 48009 48009 42615
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.15
Panizza and Yanez (2006)
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TABLE 4. PSEUDO PANEL FIXED EFFECTS (DEFINING
VARIABLES: COUNTRY, AGE, SEX, LEFT/RIGHT)
Demographics -1 -2 -3 -4 -5
Couple OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
1.09 1.014 3.01 0.836 0.3
Education respondent (0.232)** (0.286)** (0.686)** (0.313)** -0.363
1.085 0.762 0.855 0.638 0.562
Education respondent (sq) (0.120)** (0.174)** -0.581 (0.250)* (0.287)t
-0.14 -0.101 -0.087 -0.088 -0.082
(0.016)** (0.022)** -0.079 (0.030)** (0.034)*
Employment status
Public sect. employee -2.612 -2.988 6.952 -2.557 -1.242
Private sect. employee (0.354)** (0.407)** (1.498)** (0.827)** (-1.193)
0.175 -0.082 1.797 0.554 1.65
Unemployed -0.215 -0.247 (0.645)** -0.564 (0.839)*
-1.646 -1.214 1.715 0.338 1.43
Retired (0.302)** (0.396)** -1.064 -0.702 -0.956
0.291 -1.617 -5.916 -2.58 -2.072
At home -0.513 (0.597)** (1.657)** (0.730)** (0.813)*
-2.458 -2.109 0.062 -1.989 -0.931
Student (0.223)** (0.278)** -0.545 (0.496)** -0.699
0.71 1.273 2.609 ' 2.2 3.382
Asset ownership (0.404)t (0.484)** (1.207)* (0.695)** (0.854)**
Tv 0.016 0.018 0.084 0.006 -0.015
Fridge -0.039 -0.044 -0.069 -0.041 -0.042
-0.027 -0.026 -0.017 -0.013 -0.029
Computer -0.034 -0.039 -0.06 -0.036 -0.037
-0.014 -0.022 -0.006 -0.01 -0.017
Wash -0.032 -0.036 -0.053 -0.032 -0.034
-0.014 0.003 -0.046 -0.023 -0.037
Car -0.029 -0.032 -0.049 -0.03 -0.033
-0.062 -0.055 -0.087 -0.05 -0.047
Secondary house (0.026)* (0.029)t (0.045)t (0.026)t (0.028)t
-0.064 -0.088 -0.147 -0.077 -0.08
Home owner (0.035)t (0.039)* (0.059)* (0.035)* (0.039)*
0.037 0.036 0.04 0.037 0.051
Access to services -0.025 -0.028 -0.044 -0.026 (0.027)t
Drinking water 0.123 0.113 0.116 0.123 0.118
(0.039)** (0.045)* -0.072 (0.040)** (0.041)**
Hot water -0.064 -0.068 -0.046 -0.081 -0.042
(0.028)* (0.031)* -0.047 (0.029)** -0.032
Sewage system Country level var. 0.043 0.064 0.028 0.04 0.035
GDP PPP (0.000)** '-0.000 '-0.000 0
0 (0.000)** 0 (0.000)**
GDP growth -1 -0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.003)* (-0.005) (-0.004) (-0.004)
Privat. proceeds 0 0.003 '-0.000 -0.001
0 (0.001)** 0 (0.001)*
Corruption 0.003 -0.175 -0.064 -0.09






































-0.185 -0.215 -0.126 -0.182 -0.102
(0.017)** (0.023)** (0.040)** (0.051)** -0.074
-0.28 -0.316 -0.121 -0.37 -0.271
(0.020)** (0.024)** (0.046)** (0.072)** (0.092)**
-0.248 -0.292 -0.421 -0.321 -0.269
(0.021)** (0.030)** (0.066)** (0.038)** (0.058)**
-0.448 -0.51 -0.594 '-0.537 -0.377
(0.020)** (0.031)** (0.060)** (0.062)** (0.104)**
-0.376
(0.021)**
0.652 1.438 2.445 2.811 2.754
(0.283)* (0.450)** (1.386)t (0.861)** (0.990)**
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
13346 11213 6132 9858 9922
2612 2609 2393 2229 2249
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the country level). Coefficients significant at
10%: t; 5%: *; 1%: **.
